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PROPERTY, WRONGFULNESS AND THE DUTY
TO COMPENSATE
JULES L. COLEMAN*

Professor Weinrib's Causation and Wrongdoing' is a very complicated and difficult paper, rich in ideas and detailed argument. The essay
has both positive and critical ambitions. Weinrib criticizes the efforts to
explain the normative significance of causation advanced by Professors
Judith Thomson, Richard Epstein and myself. His positive view is that
causation and wrongdoing are (in some sense) conceptually connected,
and, because of this connection, they constitute separately necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions of a coherent and justifiable scheme of tort
liability.
These comments fall into two parts. In the first, I critically analyze
Weinrib's theory. In the second, I respond to Weinrib's objections to
mine.
I.

CAUSATION AND WRONGDOING

Suppose A harms B. Thomson's view is that A 's causing B's loss
provides B with a morally relevant reason for calling upon A 's assets to
rectify whatever losses he may have incurred. Not every fact about A can
provide B with a morally relevant reason for such a claim. First, not
every fact about A particularizes him, that is, distinguishes A from the
rest of the world. Second, not every distinguishing fact about A is morally relevant, that is, provides B with the basis of a moral claim against
him. For Thomson, A 's causing B's harm serves both to particularize A
and to provide a moral basis for claims B makes against A 's resources. It
is A, after all, not C, D, or E who causes B's damage. Moreover, A 's
harming B is normatively significant in the light of a complex moral theory that emphasizes free action. B's claim against A 's resources is consistent with the value we place on agents acting freely, since liability
imposes a hardship on A not for free action as such but only for harmful
action.
There is a good deal that is puzzling about this view and Weinrib
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Ph.D. 1972, The Rockefeller University; M.S.L. 1976,
Yale Law School.
I. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987) (Professor
Weinrib's article appears in this symposium issue.).
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correctly points us to much of it. First, negligence (when present) particularizes injurers just as well as causation does. If A unreasonably puts B
at risk, then this is a fact about A that is not true of everyone. Moreover,
it is a fact about A that is morally relevant to B's claims against A's
resources. For it is consistent with the value we place upon freedom of
action that individuals are encouraged not unjustifiably to impose risks
on others. One response to Thomson, then, is that both causation and
negligence can particularize injurers and do so in morally relevant ways.
Professor Weinrib agrees that causation is normatively significant,
but not because it particularizes injurers; after all, it does not. Rather
causation particularizes victims:
The difficulty with Thomson's explanation is that it concentrates
on the wrongdoer, the moral quality of whose act is unaffected by
whether the potential for harm that it releases actually comes to pass.
Accordingly, the tort requirement of causation makes no sense if we
conceive of the law as passing judgment on this moral quality as such.
Causation becomes pertinent only when we focus on the plaintiff's receipt from the defendant of an amount of money representing the harm
suffered. This compensatory transfer shows that tort law is not concerned solely with the defendant's emission of a harmful possibility but
with that possibility's coming to rest on a particular plaintiff. Inasmuch as cause particularizes,
it does so with reference to the plaintiff
2
rather than the defendant.

Causation particularizes the victim in the analytic sense that a victim, by definition, is someone who suffers harm. Thus, the fact that A
causes B harm is normatively significant because it demonstrates that B,
not someone else, was harmed, by A. So if A must pay someone, it must
be B, not C, D, or E, none of whom were harmed by A.
To this point in the argument Weinrib has not claimed that A
should pay damages to anyone, only that if he is to pay, it must be B he
pays. It was B who A injured. For Weinrib, Thomson is right to find
normative significance in causation, but wrong to identify that significance with the liability of the injurer.
The natural question for Weinrib is: what grounds the injurer's liability? Why and when must injurers pay? One answer is: an injurer
should pay damages whenever he or she causes another harm. Were this
true, we would have a full theory of liability and recovery based entirely
on causation. A pays whenever he causes harm, and he pays whomever
he harms.
Weinrib correctly points out that, of contemporary tort theorists,
only Richard Epstein holds the view that A's causing harm is (prima
2. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
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facie) sufficient to warrant liability. Epstein, however, cannot (and does
not) avail himself of Thomson's argument for the causal condition. He
cannot because Thomson's argument establishes neither the moral necessity nor the sufficiency of causation, only its moral relevance. Thus,
Thomson's argument is too weak for Epstein's purposes. Instead, on behalf of the claim that causation is sufficient for primafacie liability, Epstein relies upon one essentially conceptual and three normative
arguments. The conceptual argument is as follows. Suppose A harms B.
If A is made to bear B's loss, then A is treated by law in the same way he
would be were he to harm himself. By holding A liable whenever he
harms B, we treat him as if he had harmed himself. Had he harmed
himself, moreover, he would have no grounds for objecting to his having
to cover his own losses. Therefore, he can have no greater reason for
objecting to his having to cover the expenses he causes others. This
point, as Weinrib eloquently points out, cuts absolutely no normative ice:
Epstein concludes that because the defendant would have borne the
loss if he were identical with the plaintiff, the defendant should therefore bear the loss when the litigants are restored to their separate existences. One can equally argue, however, that because the plaintiff
would have no cause of action if he were identical with the defendant,
so no cause of action should be available when their individual identities are restored. Epstein assumes that the relevant feature of his hypothetical is that the superperson suffers an irrecoverable loss that should
remain the actor's loss in the two-party situation. But the significant
feature may be the superperson's irrecoverable loss, that should remain
irrecoverable when transposed into the 3actuality of litigation. This
reading allows no liability for any losses.
The normative arguments for strict liability are also unpersuasive.
At one time Epstein argued that A should be liable for the damage he
causes on the grounds that A is responsible for what he causes, and a just
theory of liability must be based on a theory of moral responsibility. The
problem here as I have argued-and I have no reason to believe Weinrib
would disagree-is that causation is neither necessary nor sufficient for
moral responsibility. 4 I am not justly liable for all sorts of harms I cause
you-those resulting, for example, from fair competition; whereas, I am
sometimes morally responsible for harms I ought to have prevented but
did not in fact cause.
Epstein has also argued that A should be liable for the harms he
causes B on grounds of corrective justice. A person's harming another
3. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
4. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II 2 J.L. & PHIL. 5
(1983).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

454

upsets the equilibrium that existed between the parties prior to A 's action. Therefore, A is responsible for setting matters right by reestablishing the previous equilibrium. But not every departure from the status
quo ought to be annulled or rectified. Only if in reducing B's welfare, A
does something wrong, ought B's loss be rectified. In that case, corrective justice would require negligence or wrongdoing, not merely causation, as a condition of liability. Thus, corrective justice does not support
a theory of strict liability. 5
Epstein appears to have finally settled on a defense of strict liability
in which the principle of liability falls out of a theory of property. Judging from Weinrib's paper, he too appears to maintain that a theory of
liability is presupposed by the concept of property. The difference between them is that whereas Epstein believes that strict liability is presupposed by property, Weinrib claims negligence is. In fact, no substantive
theory of liability is entailed by the concept of property. Let us see where
both Epstein and Weinrib go astray.
Weinrib puts the question this way: "what is the liability regime
correlative to the idea of property?' 6 Epstein's argument that strict liability derives from a theory of property is the following:
[I]f you deny the plaintiff the prima facie right to recover against a
stranger without proof of negligence, then you have taken a limited
property interest .... By definition, every liability rule is tied to a
correlative property interest that the law protects; to alter the one is
necessarily to change the other. The linkage is not empirical, it is anaof the way in which we do use, and must use, all legal
lytical, a function
7
language.

For Epstein, my property rights mark the boundaries of my moral
space. Any intrusion of my space is action contrary to my right. If your
intrusion results in harm, you owe me, and it does not matter whether
your intrusion was wrongful or innocent. Your liability is part of what it
means for me to have a right; it is part of the concept of a property right.
If you should harm me without compensating me, then you fail to understand the concept of property.
To understand Epstein's view, we must first define the notion of
5. This is not my complete view. While I do not believe that corrective justice requires strict
liability, I argue that corrective justice sometimes requires recompense even where the injurer does
no wrong. For example, if A innocently infringes B's right, B is entitled to repair. But in other
cases, if A innocently sets back B's legitimate interests, B has no grounds for repair as a matter of
corrective justice. When B's interests are harmed compensation is his due only if A's interference is
wrongful. See infra p. 463.
6. Weinrib, supra note I, at 425.
7. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 97-98

(1985)(emphasis altered).
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"harm." On some views, a necessary condition of harm is an invasion of
a right. (This now seems to be Feinberg's view, 8 for example, and Epstein's as well.) So when A harms B, A invades a right of his. If one has
an extensive view of property, like Epstein, then the rights A invades are
B's property rights. But what does it mean to have a property right?
For B and A it means that the latter cannot act contrary to the former's
wishes without his (B's) consent. If he does, then in doing so he takes
B's property. He does what he has no right to do, and it does not matter
whether his action was innocent, justifiable or wrongful. To show that
he understands the concept of property and to respect B's property right,
A must make amends.
There are parallels between Weinrib's criticisms of Thomson and
Epstein. In the first part of his essay, Weinrib finds himself agreeing with
Thomson that causation matters morally, but disagreeing with her regarding why it matters. Thomson focuses on causation and injurers;
Weinrib focuses on causation and victims. In the second part of his essay
he finds himself similarly situated. He agrees with Epstein that a substantive theory of liability derives from the concept of property. But he
disagrees with Epstein regarding the theory of liability to which property
gives rise. Epstein claims the concept of property yields strict liability.
Weinrib claims it yields a theory of negligence.
If he is able to make good the claim that the concept of property
presupposes a theory of negligence, Weinrib's entire argument will be
complete and coherent. Causation particularizes victims, so that if the
injurer must pay, he must pay those people his conduct injures. But
when should he pay? According to Weinrib, the concept of property tells
us he should pay whenever his conduct is negligent. But he cannot be
required to pay even if he is negligent if there is no one his negligence
harms. Only victims can be compensated. The concept of property tells
us that only negligent parties can compensate. It does not tell us that all
negligent parties must compensate. Since they can only compensate people who are victims, negligent actors must compensate all and only their
victims.
Can Weinrib make good on his claim that property yields negligence
liability? Imagine A and B again and the concept of property. Weinrib
invites us to consider three cases. In each case, B, not A, has an alleged
property right. In one case, A asserts the right to use what is in fact B's
as he, A, sees fit. In the second, A asserts the right to act as he sees fit,
knowing that occasionally his doing so will impose on B an unreasonable
8. See J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 105-06 (1984).
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risk of harm. A does not, however, claim the right to use B's property as
he sees fit. Instead, A claims the right to act without restrictions provided he does the best he can. If and when he fails to do as best he can,
he may be subject to liability for negligence. His negligence, in other
words, is measured by a subjective standard. In the third case, A claims
the right to act as he sees fit provided in doing so his conduct does not
fall below an objective standard of negligence. Weinrib argues that the
first claim is logically inconsistent with the concept of property, and that
the second is inconsistent with the concept of equality entailed by property. Only the objective negligence standard embodied in the third claim
is consistent both with the concepts of property and equality entailed by
it. Thus, property mandates negligence.
There are three separate arguments here. Common to each, however, is the alleged connection between the concepts of property and
equality. "Implicit in the notion of property is the equal standing of all
property owners. .

.

. [A]I1 property holders are as property holders

equal to each other."9 Weinrib claims that this tautology has important
normative consequences. To see how Weinrib is led to this position, let
us consider how this premise figures in the first case Weinrib invites us to
consider: the case in which A asserts the right to use B's property as he
sees fit.
Weinrib argues first that if A really can assert such a claim against
B, then the property could not really be said to be B's at all. For it is A,
not B, who has control over its use. To have property, on this view, is to
have a domain of authority or control. Second, he argues that
"[i]nasmuch as all property holders are equal," 10 A's claim to the free use
of B's property could "equally be made by everyone with respect to
everything."" Indeed, B could make the same claim against A with respect to the same property. "Such a network of crosscutting claims
would not be a regime of property for all but the impossibility of property for anyone." 1 2 Thus, A's assertion of a right to use B's property is
3
"inconsistent with the notion of property."'
There are two arguments here, only one of which explicitly relies on
the concept of equality. The other relies on treating property as specifying a domain of autonomy. Neither argument is sound, however. Focusing first on the autonomy argument, suppose B owns a house. A claims
9. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 426.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 427.
13. Id.
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to use B's house at his discretion. Is recognizing the legitimacy of A's
claim inconsistent with the claim that B owns the house-i.e., that it is
B 's, not A 's? Suppose A is free to use B's house at his will, and B never
is, but each time A uses B's house A must compensate B, that is, pay him
a rent. Imagine another case. A asserts no right to use B's house. B can
exclude others, but cannot himself use his house as he sees fit. In neither
case does B have any freedom to use his house as he sees fit. In the first
case, A has that freedom; in the second case, no one does. In neither
case is it obviously false that B has or owns property. In the first case,
for example, B's property right may not entail control over his property,
though it may be the basis of his claim to compensation for A's use of it.
Without a property right, B may be unable even to claim relief for A's
use. More generally, as I have argued elsewhere, the concept of a right
need not entail any specific claims to alienate or to exclude. 14 Such
claims are not part of the meaning of property. Rather they follow from
particular normative conceptions or theories of property. No doubt,
property without alienation or autonomy may be morally unattractive,
but it is hardly incoherent. The house remains B's even in the face of A's
assertions. It is just that property in such a regime may not be worth all
that much.
Weinrib's argument from the concept of equality is even more
troubling. He contends that A's claim to use B's property makes property impossible. The basic argument is supposed to show that if we admit that everyone is equal as a property holder, then as soon as A claims
to use B's property, everyone is equally entitled to make similar claims
against everyone else. Recognizing the legitimacy of these claims simultaneously makes property impossible.
Suppose we grant that it would be impossible to sustain a property
regime in which each person's claim to use everyone else's property was
sustainable all the time. But that is not the case Weinrib presents. In his
case, A claims a right unqualifiedly to use B's property. How can that
claim when conjoined with a principle of formal equality make property
impossible? Recognizing A's claim to the free use of B's property means
that as a matter of formal equality we are committed to recognizing as
valid all claims made by others that are relevantly similar to A 's. It does
not mean recognizing as valid all claims regardless of their similarity to
A 's. It is not A's making an assertion to use B's property that is problematic. What counts is the basis of his assertion and the similarity of
14. Coleman & Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1340-1352
(1986).
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those grounds to the grounds others present. What is the basis of A's
claim to use B's property? He may claim no basis at all; or he may claim
his status of being equal as a property holder to B; or he may have some
other reason, for example, need. If A's claim is groundless, then, if we
recognize it, we are committed to recognizing all similar-i.e., groundless-claims. Property may then be unimaginable. Also, if A's claim is
based merely on his status as a property holder, we are again committed
to recognizing all such claims. In that case, the concept of property
which forms the basis of A's claim unravels. On the other hand, if A has
a substantial basis for his claim to use B's property, then, while the principle of formal equality may commit us to recognizing as valid all similar
claims, it does not commit us to a set of crosscutting claims that render
property impossible. No one, merely by virtue of their status as a property holder, has the same claim to B's property that A does.
Weinrib is mistaken in claiming that property is impossible whenever we recognize a single claim to the discretionary use of another's
property. The question remains whether he is correct in claiming that
the concepts of equality and property yield negligence. For Weinrib, reasonable care is specified in cost-benefit terms. A's conduct is negligent if
and only if the costs of prevention are less than the costs of harm to B
discounted by the probability of its occurrence. "The virtue of the negligence standard is that it regulates the relationship between the property
holders on the basis of equality."' 5 The theory of strict liability violates
this principle of equality because it entails the judgment that the victim's
property is always more valuable than the injurer's free action. The theory of absolute victim liability-i.e., the principle of nonrecovery-violates the principle of equality because it entails the judgment that the
injurer's freedom is always more valuable than the victim's property.
The subjective theory of negligence violates the principle of equality because it gives a special status or preference to the injurer's capacities.
Only negligence counts the relevant interests of injurers and victims
equally. Only it is required by the concept of property.
There are two problematic facets of this argument. The first is that
the actual argument for negligence never invokes the concept of property, and so it can hardly be said to be entailed by it. Second, the principle of formal equality is compatible with every scheme of liability-from
negligence to strict liability to no liability. Let us examine these
problems in turn.
Weinrib's argument for negligence never invokes, nor need it in15. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 428.
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voke, the concept of property. Instead, it is an instance of the familiar
argument that standard utilitarianism (cost-benefit analysis or efficiency)
is not only compatible with but, in fact, embodies an ideal of equality.
According to this conception of equality, each person must count for one
and no more than one; this is the idea of equal standing. Utilitarianism
satisfies or embodies this ideal because in determining right conduct each
person's interests, preferences or desires count for one. The costs to the
potential victim count no more nor less than the benefits to the potential
injurer, and right conduct is determined by an objective balancing of the
two. There is no need to invoke the idea of a property right in defending
the negligence standard. Indeed, in ordinary normative discourse, arguments from rights are invoked precisely to counter the utilitarian argument, not to serve as a premise in its derivation. For the very point of
appealing to property rights is to establish that considerations of utility
maximization-in which each person's interests are counted equallyare inadequate to overcome certain claims. Claims of right implicitly
deny that normative conclusions are to follow exclusively from balancing
based on an equal consideration of interests. When B claims a property
right against A, part of what he means to assert is that it does not matter
whether A's taking property from him can be shown to have desirable
utilitarian consequences; A simply has no right to take. The whole point
of appealing to property rights is to deny that A's interests are to count
equally with B's.
It is possible to make property rights yield a utilitarian theory of
negligence by advocating a utilitarian theory of rights. Those rights we
have and the claims to which they give rise are those that maximize utility. In this case, the cost-benefit theory of negligence rests on a normative theory of property-not on the idea or concept of property itself.
Moreover, while the argument for negligence based on a utilitarian theory of rights is compatible with the principle of formal equality, simply
because utilitarianism is, the argument itself in no way relies upon the
principle of equality. In other words, it is possible to derive a negligence
standard from property directly without recourse to a principle of equality. Moreover, the negligence principle derives from a contestable normative theory of property, not from the concept of property itself, or
from its alleged corollary, the principle of equality.
In summary, the principle of formal equality can be spelled out in
such a way as to require no more than the equal consideration of interests. From the principle that everyone is entitled to an equal consideration of interests, it may be possible to derive a principle of negligence.
Doing so invokes the principle of equality but not the concept of prop-
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erty. On the other hand, one can invoke, a particular theory of property
rights in order to derive the principle of negligence liability. But the theory of property that's needed is a utilitarian one. In that case, the theory
of negligence requires a contestable normative theory of property. Once
again negligence does not derive from the idea of property itself, but from
a theory of property that is in any case incompatible with various other
conceptions of property-notably the Lockean one. The problem with
both Epstein and Weinrib, then, is that one cannot derive a substantive
theory of liability from the concept of property.
As far as I can judge from Weinrib's brief discussion of it, the principle of equality requires that we treat property right bearers equally as
property right bearers. It should be obvious, then, that this principle is
satisfied no matter what the liability rule is, provided it applies to all
property right holders. For example, a rule of strict liability does not
favor one set of property holders over another. All property owners, as
property owners, will be entitled to repair whenever they are injured by
the conduct of others; and all property owners (and others) who injure
property owners will be required to make repair. The same can be said
for a rule of no liability. (Remember property owners are given equal
respect even when they are all treated with no respect at all.) In the same
way that one cannot derive substantive normative conclusions from
premises allegedly elucidating conceptual connections, one cannot derive
substantive claims about liability rules from purely formal principles.
II.

ON THE SYMMETRY BETWEEN WRONGFUL LOSS AND GAIN

Professor Weinrib's overall position is the following: Causation particularizes victims; negligence particularizes injurers. "A wrongful act
that does not injure lacks impact upon a specific victim; an injury that is
not the materialization of a wrong is a misfortune devoid of normative
significance for its author. For tort law wrongfulness without causation
6
is empty; causation without wrongfulness is blind."'
Professor Weinrib believes not only that negligence and causation
are necessary to a coherent theory of tort liability, but that they are conceptually or analytically connected as well. That is the reason why once
Weinrib has established to his satisfaction the moral necessity of both
causation and negligence, he turns his attention to me. Weinrib takes me
in part as advancing the view he does-i.e., that both causation and
wrongdoing matter-with one major qualification. Unlike Weinrib, the
central claim I make is that liability and recovery are conceptually and
16. Id. at 430.
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normatively distinguishable.' 7 While Weinrib and I agree about the need
for causation and negligence in a just theory of liability, we disagree
about whether liability and recovery are! conceptually and normatively
distinguishable. If he is right that a tort law that emphasizes wrongfulness without causation and causation without wrongfulness is both
empty and blind, then the apparent trouble with my theory of torts is
that it is both empty and blind--even if "ingenious." 18 In what follows,
let me see if I can convince you that my view may be right as well as
ingenious.
What, according to Weinrib, is my view, and where do I go wrong?
I draw two distinctions: one between the grounds of recovery and liability; the other between the grounds and modes of rectification. The question, "has this plaintiff suffered a loss which ought to be annulled or
rectified?" is analytically distinct from the question, "has this injurer
done something which justifies his being held liable?" Once we decide
that a particular plaintiff has suffered a loss that ought to be annulled, we
then ask, how ought this loss be annulled? I also advance the view that
tort law is a matter of justice at least to the extent that the principle of
corrective justice helps to determine which gains and losses ought to be
annulled. A victim of another's wrong suffers a wrongful loss which corrective justice says must be annulled. But it does not follow that the
injurer must make repair. At least corrective justice does not require
that injurers compensate their victims. So I deny exactly what Professor
Weinrib hopes to demonstrate: namely, the normative significance of the
alleged conceptual connection between wrongdoing and causation.
Weinrib claims that my view can be described as follows: "whereas
causation and wrongfulness are both morally significant to the victim,
causation has no normative significance for the tortfeasor.'' 9 The idea is
that for a victim to be entitled to repair, his loss must have been caused
by the negligence of an injurer. However, the injurer's wrongful gain is
the result of his negligence, not his having caused someone harm. To be
negligent is to fail to take the accident precautions one ought to have
taken. Those savings constitute the injurer's wrongful gain. This is a
gain he secures whether or not he injures anyone. Thus, Weinrib's conclusion is that I sever the relationship between wrongdoing and causation, a relationship, he argues, that is conceptually necessary.
It is true that I draw a distinction between the grounds of recovery
17. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, II J.
18. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 433.
19. Id. at 431.

LEGAL STUD.

421 (1982).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

and liability, but it is not true that I argue that causation is irrelevant to
liability. Let us distinguish between three cases involving wrongful gain.
In one, A negligently imposes unreasonable risks on B by, for example,
driving negligently. In another, A's negligent driving injures B. In the
third case, A's negligent driving injures B, and in so doing enables A to
win a wager he made with C. In the first two cases, A's wrongful gain is
equivalent to his savings from failing to take adequate precautions. In
both cases, that gain is secured whether or not B is injured. In the third
case, A secures two distinct gains in virtue of his negligence: one is the
savings in precautions; the other is the money from the wager. The latter
gain depends on his causing B harm. Nevertheless, it is a gain corrective
justice may require be eliminated. So it cannot be, and is not, part of my
view that causation is irrelevant to wrongful gain. Rather, my view is
that there is a distinction between the wrongful gains one secures independent of causing harm and the wrongful gains one secures as a consequence of causing harm. Both are wrongful gains which require
annulment. In one case, these gains exist independent of resulting harm
to others, and so the existence of another's loss is not the logical or causal
basis of the gain. So if A negligently hits B (as in case two above), the
gain he secures results from his negligence, not from his hitting B. A's
gain, in this case, is the same as it is in the case in which he drives negligently but does not hit anyone. In both cases, A's causing B harm is
irrelevant to his gain. From this it does not follow that causation never
figures in the creation of wrongful gain. I have never suggested otherwise. What I have tried to do is to make two points: First, that wrongful
gain can arise without resulting harm; and second, that sometimes even
when negligence creates wrongful loss, the wrongful gain from negligence
is causally independent of the loss it causes.
Causation can matter for reasons other than corrective justice as
well. A's causing B a wrongful loss, whether or not A gains wrongfully,
is relevant to determining who should repair B's loss. If A does not gain,
then corrective justice does not require that A pay B. But I do not claim
that there are no other persuasive considerations, moral or economic, for
having A pay. Nor do I deny that these reasons for having A pay can
sometimes have something to do with causation. For example, A harms
B causing a wrongful loss but creating no wrongful gain. A has no gain
that is the concern of corrective justice. A's paying B, therefore, cannot
be required by corrective justice. Suppose the best argument for having
A pay B is an economic one. A is in the best position to decide whether
such harms are worth their costs, and imposing the victim's loss on him
gives him the proper incentive for making that decision. Suppose further
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that the most reliable indicator of who is best able to decide whether
accidents are worth their costs is those who cause accidents. Then causation is important for liability, but for economic reasons, not for reasons
of corrective justice.
Weinrib mischaracterizes my view on two fronts. First, in determining an injurer's liability, causation can matter even on corrective justice
grounds. Second, in determining an injurer's liability, causation can
count for reasons other than corrective justice.
Maybe I should make my view more precise, because doing so will
enable me to respond to several other of Professor Weinrib's objections.
If a victim suffers a loss owing to the negligence of an injurer, he is entitled as a matter of corrective justice to recover. If an injurer invades a
right of his (permissibly or not), the victim is likewise entitled to repair as
a matter of justice. So I must (and I do) distinguish between being
harmed and having a right invaded or infringed. A harm is an interference with a legitimate interest. Not every interest, however, is protected
by a right. When we have rights, justice, not the concept of property,
requires that losses resulting from their invasion be repaired. And it does
not matter whether the invasion of the right is wrongful, permissible or
laudatory. Interests are another matter. We are always interfering with
one another's interests-unavoidably sometimes. With regard to interests, someone is entitled to repair only if the losses he suffers result from
the wrongful or unjustifiable behavior of others. So much for justice and
the grounds of recovery. What about liability and corrective justice?
Corrective justice requires that wrongful gains be annulled. One can
secure wrongful gain without injuring another, as in negligent but not
harmful driving. One can injure without securing wrongful gain. That
is, one can take optimal precautions and still cause another damage. (In
that case there is neither wrongful gain nor wrongful loss.) One can
cause compensable loss without securing wrongful gain. If in order to
save my life I take and destroy what is rightfully yours, then you have
suffered a loss which justice claims should be annulled, but I have secured no wrongful gain. I have gained alright. I have, after all, saved my
life. However, provided my doing so is justifiable, the gain I secure is not
a wrongful one.
I can cause you to suffer a wrongful loss without securing any gain,
wrongful or otherwise. I can gain, but not wrongfully, in causing you a
wrongful loss-as when I take your property to save my life. I can secure a wrongful gain and cause you no loss at all-as when I drive negligently. I can secure a wrongful gain and cause you a wrongful loss
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though my gain is not consequent upon your loss-as when my negligent
driving harms you. Finally, I can secure a wrongful gain by imposing a
wrongful loss upon you, in which case my gain is consequent upon your
loss-as in the wager case.
What about my duty to make good your loss? First, in those cases
in which I gain and my doing so results in no harm to you, I have secured a gain that needs to be annulled but you have absorbed no wrongful loss. I simply cannot have a duty to compensate you. For what loss?
What about those cases in which I have secured wrongful gain and you
have sustained a wrongful loss as a result, as well as those cases in which
you have absorbed a wrongful loss though I have secured no wrongful
gain? Here my view is surely controversial and I am not in a position to
defend all aspects of it here. The key is the difference between the
grounds and modes of rectification. Corrective justice specifies reasons
or grounds for compensation, not modes of compensation. If I gain
wrongfully and you lose wrongfully, corrective justice says your loss and
my gain ought to be annulled. It does not specify that the way to annul
both is by having me pay you. My paying you is compatible with corrective justice, though not required by it. Similarly, where you lose wrongfully, but I secure no wrongful gain, corrective justice maintains that
your loss needs to be redressed, though I have no gain which needs to be
annulled. One way of rectifying your loss is by having me pay, and doing
so is compatible with corrective justice, but again not required by it.
Corrective justice is satisfied whenever our wrongful gains and losses are
annulled. One way of doing so is by having injurers compensate victims.
That mode of rectification, I have argued, is compatible with corrective
justice, but by no means required by it. Thus, corrective justice may not
provide the best explanation of this key feature of the tort system:
namely, the duty of injurers to compensate those whom they have caused
to sustain wrongful losses.
I have been misread, notably by Richard Posner, 20 as claiming that
when A injures B wrongfully but secures no gain in doing so, A has no
duty to compensate B. This is not my view, as I have just made clear.
My view is that A may have a duty to compensate the victims of his
mischief, but the justification of that duty is not and cannot be corrective
justice. My critics, like Epstein and to a lesser extent Weinrib, try to
justify the duty to compensate one's victims as being a matter of corrective justice. They urge a reading of the principle of corrective justice
20. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187 (1981).
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according to which those who cause harm must repair their victim's
losses. Rather than solving the problem of justifying the duty to compensate, this strategy merely renames the problem. We still have to justify
the duty to compensate, only now we are calling "the duty to compensate," the "principle of corrective justice."
These days I am inclined to the view that the duty of injurers to
compensate their victims is not a matter of justice or of morality, but of
utility or, broadly speaking, deterrence. Though I do not deny that injurers sometimes have a duty to compensate their victims, I deny that the
duty to compensate is a matter of corrective justice.
Weinrib objects to my thesis that the injurer's wrongful gain is analytically distinct from the victim's wrongful loss. Weinrib argues that
whenever there is wrongful gain there is correlative wrongful loss, and
whenever there is wrongful loss there is correlative wrongful gain.
Weinrib correctly notes that, in my view, when A imposes unjustifiable
risks on B, A has secured a wrongful gain independent of B's suffering a
wrongful loss. But, he argues, has not B suffered a wrongful loss, namely
the imposition of an unreasonable risk? Is not that loss in security both
wrongful and correlative of A's gain? Here I think Weinrib is correct.
We can treat a reduction in security as a loss, and in the event it results
from another's wrong, it can be a wrongful loss. The gains and losses are
analytically connected, but what is the normative significance of the connection? A has secured a gain that ought to be annulled and B has suffered a loss that ought to be annulled. For insurance, monitoring and
administrative reasons, tort law does not in general recognize these
losses-i.e., risks-as compensable. In principle torts could permit compensation for risk. Even if tort law did identify dimunition in security as
a compensable loss, it would still be my view that corrective justice
would not require that those who wrongfully reduce security must compensate their victims.
Weinrib takes his insight too far. He claims if A negligently injures
B, and not merely puts him at risk, then B suffers no additional wrongful
loss, that is, no wrongful loss greater than that which he suffers from A
imposing an unreasonable risk upon him. Actual harm from negligence
does not constitute a greater wrongful loss than does the loss in security
from negligence. In Weinrib's words:
Just as the injury brings the defendant no accretion of gain, so it also
imposes on the plaintiff no additional wrongfulness. The actual injury
makes the plaintiff worse off than before, but it does not make him the
victim of further wrongfulness any more than it makes the perpetrator
the recipient of further gain. When the injury occurs, the same dis-
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junction between risk and materialization that clears the defendant of
wrongful gain precludes the plaintiff from alleging that the injury is a
wrongful loss. The reasoning that limits the defendant's wrongful gain
plaintiff's
to the unreasonable creation of risk similarly limits the
21
wrongful loss to the unreasonable exposure to that risk.
Weinrib does not deny that B suffers a greater loss when A's negligence injures him than he does when A merely imposes unreasonable
risks upon him. He denies that B suffers any greater wrongful loss. The
reason is that A does no further wrong in injuring B. The wrong he did
consists in the imposition of unreasonable risk. His wrong stopped in
logical space at the point he imposed unreasonable risks on B. In suffering injury, B suffers no greater "wrongfulness." Therefore, he suffers no
greater wrongful loss.
This argument rests on an equivocation regarding the use of the
term "wrongful." In ordinary language, a wrongful loss is a loss resulting from another's wrongdoing. Because the same wrong can lead to
greater or lesser relative damage, the same wrongdoing can give rise to
greater or lesser wrongful losses. Weinrib is obviously using a different
concept of "wrongful loss," according to which a wrongful loss does not
refer to the causal consequences of one's wrongdoing. Wrongful loss is
the conjunction of wrong and loss. A loss is an increased wrongful loss
only if it is the result of greater wrong, not just a greater loss from the
same wrong. Frankly, I find Weinrib's usage implausible. It may be true
that I do no greater wrong in harming you than I do when I impose
unjustifiable risks, but I can do greater damage. You have experienced a
greater loss. If the loss I caused resulted from my wrongdoing, then you
have suffered a wrongful loss. The greater the loss, the greater the
wrongful loss, even if the moral quality of the injurer's conduct itself
does not change.
Weinrib's other objection seeks to make the same point. He writes:
Now let us move to the other side of the relationship. Coleman
takes the defendant's gain to be the expenditure foregone through not
eliminating the risk, with the wrongfulness consisting in the fact that
the precautions against the risk were less costly than the gravity of the
injury discounted by its likelihood. This conception of wrongful gain
is adequate for the time of the defendant's wrongful act. However,
since the judgment of wrongfulness involves a balancing of expenditure
against risk, the gain can be superseded in the same way that the risk
zan be. Once the risk materializes into injury, the savings realized by
not eliminating this risk have no greater significance than the risk does.
The conception of gain must keep pace with the stage of the risk's
maturation. Given the actuality of injury, the defendant's gain can no
21. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 436.
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longer be the amount sufficient to eliminate the potential for injury but
must now be the amount that would undo the injury itself. Therefore,
the damage award, which is designed to restore the plaintiff to his position antecedent to the occurrence of the tort, is the equivalent in the
post-injury stage of the savings foregone by the defendant at the time
of his negligent action. If the savings are the defendant's wrongful
gain at the time of the creation of the risk, the
22 damages are the wrongful gain once the risk matures into injury.
Here the objection is that if the victim's actual damages are a measure of his wrongful loss, then the wrongful gain to the injurer is what
would have been necessary to annul that loss. The strategy is clear. If I
respond to Weinrib's first argument by claiming that actual injury increases a victim's wrongful loss when compared with the reduction in
security created by the injurer's negligence, Weinrib counters that the
injurer's wrongful gain also extends to the victim's damages. The injurer's gain is not just the savings in failing to take adequate precautions.
Rather, it is the savings in failing to prevent or annul the victim's loss.
Once the risk A creates negligently results in damage, the damages he
could have prevented represent both the victim's wrongful loss and his
wrongful gain. From the ex post perspective, the damages are a measure
of what it would take for the injurer to rectify the loss. Damages, therefore, are the measure of his gain, his wrongful gain.
What makes my conduct wrongful? It is not that I injure you, for I
can injure you without doing wrong, and I can do wrong without injuring you. The wrong consists in my failing to do what I had a duty to do,
or my doing what I had no right to do. In the case of my negligence,
what is the wrong I do? It is failing to take the precautions which a
reasonable person would have taken. It is not my failing to prevent injury to you. For had I taken reasonable precautions, you might still have
been injured, and suffered a loss but not a wrongful one. So my duty was
not to prevent the harm to you. Compare three cases. In one, I have a
duty to take reasonable care. In another, I have a duty to take sufficient
care to prevent injury. In the third, I have no duty to take precautions,
instead I have a duty to make good your losses should you suffer damages. Suppose I fail to do what I have a duty to do in each case. What is
my wrongful gain in each? I submit that in the first case my wrongful
gain is the difference between the precautions I should have taken and
those I did take. In the second it is the difference between the precautions I took and those which would have been necessary to prevent the
injury. Only in the third case, is my gain equal to your loss. Wh ,? Only
22. Id. at 437-38 (footnote omitted).
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in the third case is your loss equal to my benefit from failing to discharge
my duty to you. In negligence law, my responsibility does not consist in
annulling your loss; it consists in taking reasonable precautions. For my
failure to reimburse you for your damages to constitute a wrongful gain,
I first have to have a duty to make good those losses. But that is the
third case above, not the first.
In sum, Weinrib has two related objections that seek to make the
same point, namely that wrongful gain and wrongful loss are conceptually inseparable. The first objection is this: If A's wrongful gain is the
savings from failing to take reasonable care, then B's wrongful loss isjust
the diminution in security from A's failing to take reasonable care. So
wherever there is wrongful gain there is wrongful loss. I believe Weinrib
is right about this and I must modify my position. Therefore, I withdraw
the claim that I have stood by till now that A can secure a wrongful gain,
by, for example, driving negligently without imposing a wrongful loss.
However, this conceptual point need make no normative difference. For
it does not follow that corrective justice requires that these wrongful
gains and losses be annulled by having those who gain from negligence
compensate those whose security is diminished. Next, (and here is where
Weinrib begins to go wrong), Weinrib considers the case in which the
negligent actor actually injures his victim thereby creating a loss (or diminution in welfare) greater than the loss from reduced security. About
this case Weinrib has two different claims to make. First, he claims that
the victim who is injured by negligence sustains no greater wrongful loss
than the person who merely has his security reduced by non-harm-causing negligence. That is because the injurer has done no greater wrong.
Second, he claims that whatever a victim's wrongful loss is, the injurer's
gain can always be characterized as being equal to it. Simply, the injurer's gain is just what it would cost him ex post to rectify his victim's
loss. Taken together, these arguments are intended to undermine my
claim that normatively, for the purposes of designing institutions to deal
with the distribution of accident costs, we can separate wrongful gain
.from wrongful loss.
Neither of Weinrib's arguments is ultimately persuasive. The first
rests on a stipulated definition of wrongful loss. But why should the
wrongfulness of the loss be a function entirely of the injurer's conduct
and not a function of both the injurer's conduct and the victim's loss.
Weinrib nowhere defends his very implausible definition of wrongful loss.
Weinrib's second argument presupposes at one level that I might be
correct in thinking that when A negligently injures B he causes B a
greater wrongful loss than when he merely negligently imposes risks on
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B. His dispute with me is that it does not follow that because A's wrongful gain is the same in both cases, it can, therefore, be separated from B's
wrongful loss which is greater in the second than in the first case. In his
view, because the benefit to A can be construed simply as the cost of
annulling B's wrongful loss, A's wrongful gain equals B's damages or
wrongful loss.
This argument simply will not wash. If Weinrib were right he
would have succeeded in destroying the entire enterprise of law and economics by linguistic fiat. Suppose wrongful gain always equals wrongful
loss as Weinrib suggests it does. Then no actor would ever have an incentive for taking accident preventive measures. The gains from the accident would always equal the costs. Spending money on prevention
would be irrational. The very idea of taking accident preventive measures that create net gains would be analytically impossible. Weinrib's
thesis makes the economic inquiry into liability rules uninteresting by
definition.
This objection needs to be amplified somewhat. Suppose that
through his fault A injures B causing S200 of damages. By Weinrib's
account, A thereby secures a wrongful gain of $200 because that is what
it would cost A ex post to rectify B's loss. But on what grounds could we
claim that A had acted negligently in the first place? Consider: On the
standard economic analysis of negligence that Weinrib endorses, A would
be negligent only if the costs of prevention-that is, his gain if he fails to
take precautions-is less than $200, say, $100. If A does not take $100
worth of precautions to avoid a $200 loss, he is negligent, his gain of $100
is wrongful and the loss in which it results, namely $200, is also wrongful. The idea of ex ante wrongful gain is analytically connected to the
very concept of negligence. A is negligent only if his gain in not taking
precautions is less than the expected cost of the harm. But if B's loss is
necessarily and always equivalent to A's gain, by not taking precautions
A cannot be said to have acted negligently. And if he has not acted negligently, then by Weinrib's own account, B 's loss is not wrongful; neither,
therefore, is A's gain. So there is no basis for holding him liable. More
importantly, there will never be any net social gains by increased accident prevention. By always equating gains with losses, Weinrib turns the
"accident prevention game" from a positive to a zero sum game.
Fortunately for both the economic analysis of law and for me,
Weinrib is simply wrong. Your actual damages cannot constitute my
wrongful gain unless they are the result of my wrong. But my wrong is
my failing to take reasonable precautions. If I have a duty to pay you
your damages which I then fail to discharge, then I have secured a
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wrongful gain equal to your damages--otherwise not. My duty, therefore, derives from a normative theory of liability, not from the fact of my
negligence having caused you harm. To see this, just imagine that I had
no duty to compensate for the losses created by my negligence, but did
have a duty not to be negligent. Were I negligent, I would secure the
gains of having taken inadequate precautions. However, your loss which
results from my gain is not equal to my wrongful gain because ex hypothesi I have no duty to make good your loss. Now if we change the
example and impose on me a duty to compensate you, then should I fail
to do so, I secure a wrongful gain equal to your damages.
Finally, Weinrib argues as if demonstrating a conceptual connection
between wrongful gain and loss would undermine my position. But it
would not. Even if everything Weinrib argues for were correct, it does
not follow that we could not normatively distinguish recovery from liability. Whatever the conceptual connections between wrongful gains and
losses may be, it can still turn out that it is better to annul wrongful gains
one way and to rectify wrongful losses another. That surely has always
been my central point, and therefore no demonstration of an alleged analytic connection between gain and loss need matter from a normative
point of view.

